Re: Conjunction Saul Epstein Tue, 13 Jan 1998 13:18:21 -0600 From: Rob Zook Date: Monday, January 12, 1998 9:11 AM >At 03:22 PM 1/11/98 -0600, Saul Epstein wrote: >>From: Rob Zook >>Date: Sunday, January 11, 1998 1:29 PM >> >>> Now I suppose one could think of a class as a set. In colloqual >>> use, one might even use them interchangible. However, I mean class >>> in it's sense of "a group whose members have certain attibutes in >>> common; a catagory". So, I think of set by the more general >>> mathematical definition of, "a collection of distinct elements". >>> In the mathematical set, the members do not _necessarily_ have >>> any similarity to one another. >> >>Oh! That I didn't know. I mean, how often does anyone bother to >>define a set of things that have nothing in common? > >Not, "nothing in common", but not necessarily similar. For example, the >set of all things in the trash can. Most of the things in my trash can >have no similarity to each other, but they do have one thing in common - >location inside the same container. So am I understanding correctly that what matters is what "owns" the similarity? Objects with similar locations may constitute a set on that basis, but if the objects THEMSELVES aren't similar, they can't constitute a class? >>> A set would seem more abstract than my intent, in "Spock is a >>> Vulcan". >> >>Well, you can probably read "class" for each of my uses of "set" >>then. > >Ok, then you can probably read "tense/aspect/whatever" for my >uses of the word tense ;> Touché. However, I'm now tempted to retract my statement. If my understanding of the difference between set and class is anything like correct, I actually did mean set when I said set. >>That's what I meant. ("different relationships _between sets_") So >>"Some Vulcans are male" notes an intersection of the set "Vulcans" >>and the set "Male things." > >But that's a slightly different distinction. I mean it's one >assumption, behind the phrase, but interprating it as only meaning >that looses the other connotation of class - elements possessing >similar qualities. This potentially confuses me again. Location seems to me to be a property, so that objects whose locations are similar could, according to this, constitute a class of similarly located objects. Do objects in a class have to be similar in all their properties? >>> >Then there are no entities. >>> >>> I don't understand, how that follows. I was trying to make a >>> distinction between words for things, and das ding an sich. >>> An entity is a word, which describes something at the most >>> abstract level possible. And so it represents an abstraction >>> we have created of some thing. A purely mental abstraction. >> >>What I meant to suggest was this question. What is a thing with no >>qualities? It isn't. > >That seems like a nice strange loop too. I'm just curious to know if it's your understanding that an undefined thing can exist. >>The names of entities are words. Words are entities, and therefore >>their own names. I'm not using entity to mean the idea or the name of >>something. We have other words for that. > >What I meant was entity refers to a object devoid of any it's >possible characteristics or qualities, i,e. at the most abstracted >level. OK. I don't think objects exist at that level. >>In other words, all words are entities, and therfore some entities >>are words. But, just because entities all have names, doesn't mean >>all entities are words. > >I did not imply that. I said "An entity is a word which describes something >at the most abstract level possible". I guess I should have >said, The word 'entity' describes some bit o' <*> at the most abstract >level possible". BTW, One of the benefits of a non-ambiguous grammar is >supposedly we won't have problems like this. OK. That's not my understanding of the word "entity," hence my objections. At the most abstract level possible, <*> and all of its bits are isomorphic, in that they are equally amorphous. Which makes talking about the bits..,unlikely? >>And in any case, while it's important to >>recognize the mental and abstract nature of all this, there doesn't >>seem to BE anything else to work with, which makes "mental >>abstraction" an indistinct characterization. > >Perhaps, a little redundant, too. Although, couldn't one consider >a sculpture or a painting a physical abstraction? :-) > >>All of which makes the distinction between some supposedly more >>concrete Whorf and the "abstract" Whorf of experience useless. >>Important, yes, vital even. But useless. > >Not, useless. People identify with their abstractions of those bits of ><*> and the words describing those bits of <*>, so thouroughly, that >they block out other aspects of the bits of <*>. Sometimes it's >absolutely necessary, but if one has no awareness that the process >occurs, one cannot control it. That is useful. Or, to put it more >elegantly, "Tis an ill wind that blows no minds". Indeed, very nice. What I meant by useless is that, in itself, the recognition that there are no things, only references, does nothing but undermine existence at all levels, including human. It is important and necessary, I don't mean to disagree with you on that. But if we are to create any value through being in and interacting with the world, we have to ignore it. So it seems that the perfect mental state would be one of simultaneous knowledge and ignorance of this one truth. Knowledge because it is true, but ignorance because if it's true nothing else is. >>And hence my clarification that I meant acts a question mark, >>not as a question. > >Well, I guess I did not find that very clear-ifying ;-) Then, or now? I could spend more time on that, which would certainly be more constructive. -- from Saul Epstein liberty*uit,net http://www,johnco,cc,ks,us/~sepstein "Surak ow'phaaper thes'hi thes'tca'; thes'phaadjar thes'hi suraketca'." -- K'dvarin Urswhl'at