Re: Logical Vulcan take II (and other assorted sundries) Rob Zook Sat, 10 Jan 1998 15:54:11 -0600 At 11:08 AM 1/10/98 -0600, Saul wrote: >From: Rob Zook >Date: Friday, January 9, 1998 5:22 PM >> It just makes sense to me to consider the variables as an extended >> use of a consonent naming system, and that leaves us lacking a >> corresponding system for vowels. > >OK. But the only real reason that consonants have "names" is that you >really can't pronounce a stop without a vowel before it or after it. >Whereas with vowels you can. So while P in isolution could be spoken >[puu] or [pii] or [p^] -- or [^p] -- U in isolation can be spoken >[u]. And therefore I don't know that we need different names for the >vowels. Well, I agree sort of. But if I say a [u], there's till going to be a stop in there somewhere. Just pronouncing the sound alone, it ends, it stops [u.]. Also, most languages have a naming scheme for _all_ the letters, including the vowels. For example, in English, when I say the letter [u] refering to it as a letter, I say [yoo.]. It starts with a palatal voiced approximate, then the vowel, and ends with an unvoiced glottal stop. The same holds true with all the other vowels: [eyii.], [ii.], [ayii.], [oo.], [yoo.]. >> whl'q'nedii'at krupat'oram plak >> whl'q'n-e-dii-'at krupat'oram plak >> vulcan-[plural]-[unv. affirm] blue-green blood. > >I guess I should ask you to explain to me the difference between >universal affirmation and set reference. The logic primer I've used says it a little clearer on universal affirmation than I can: "The _quality_ of a categorical proposition indicates the nature of the relationship it affirms between its subject and predicate terms: it is an *affirmative* proposition if it states that the class designated by its subject term is included, in whole or in part, in the class designated by its predicate term, and it is a *negative* proposition if it wholly or partially excludes members of the subject class from the predicate class. The predicate term is distributed in every negative proposition but undistributed in all affirmative propositions. "The _quantity_ of a categorical proposition, on the other hand, is a measure of the degree to which the relationship between its subject and predicate terms holds: it is a *universal* proposition if the asserted inclusion or exclusion holds for every member of the class designated by its subject term, and it is a *particular* proposition if it merely asserts that the relationship holds for one or more members of the subject class. Thus, the subject term is distributed in all universal propositions but undistributed in every particular propositions." I'm also not sure what you mean by a set reference. But the universal affirmation operator then "distributes" the subject term, but not the predicate term. >> Well, that's qualification, not classification. I see those as two >> distinctly different mental events. In qualification you associate >> some quality with a class. In classification, you assert some >> actual entity is a member of a class. > >I guess. How do you associate some quality with an actual entity, >then? Actually entities do not possess qualities, only their abstractions. If I were to say, "Whorf is a linguistics genius", that amounts to the affirmation that all members of the catagory "Whorf" possess the quality of "linguistic genius". Since what I call Worf, is not the actual entity, but my personal conception of him. That being the class of all experiences I associate with the actual entity. An abstraction of all the sensory impressions and secondary facts I know about the actually entity. For the _only_ experience I ever have of the actual entity, consists of the abstracted sensory events, and secondary facts filtered thru the Whorf class. So in one sense, it amounts to the same thing, but in another it never happens. > >I haven't mentioned it, that's true. It is, however, the way "entity >words" are used in the source documents. Hmm.,that could be, but I did not know how to inteprete them in that way until you mentioned the possibility. >Yes. These would be necessary anyway. Basically, we need the >indicative or demonstrative correspondents of these. Then for when, >there for where, therefore for wherefore (why), and that for what. We >have he/she, whose interrogative is who. Then we just need a way to >mark the indicative forms as interrogatives. The particle is a >sentence-level marker, while these would be word-level. I would not say that's quite accurate, from what Prof. Zvelebil put in his "more on Vulcan" message: a) Qa Apock-ash qa Kirk-ash, "Is it Spock or Kirk?" liter. "Interrog. -Spock-or interrog. - Kirk -or". Which I would gloss as "Is it true for Spock?, or is it true for Kirk?" e) Is it Vucaln blood?" = Qa W~l'q'n'at plak. "It is the precious green Vulcan blood. "= A: Although he uses it for sentences too. I would call it a proposition level interrogative. >> When I posted my piece on logical connectives, I finished by saying >> I would post more on prepositional connectives. You replied you >> wondered what I meant by "prepositional connectives". I could not >> think of a good way of describing them at the time, other than they >> would seperate prepositions. > >I've forgotten. Do you mean "propositions" and "propositional?" >Because if so I think I know what you mean. Yes. >Yeah, we're going to need a different word. I know and, or, etc. are >called "logical operators," but the rest of these are logical too. >Overwhelmingly so. So to call them non-logical is..,non-logical. ;-, I don't mind calling them something else, but I'll be damned if I can think of what else we can call them :-) Maybe go back to "proposition connectives"? Rob Z. -------------------------------------------------------- Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. 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